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Abstract 
This paper reports the findings of a research project initiated to assess work-related 
fleet safety issues in a state government organisation. In particular, special attention is given 
to identifying fleet safety factors for integration into a wider Workplace Health and Safety 
Management System (WHSMS). This exploratory case study was carried out across five 
regional areas, within the state of Queensland, and involved two major components: i) field 
based interviews; and ii) an analysis of organisational fleet safety operational procedures. 
Face-to-face interviews (n=146) were conducted with a wide range of staff, using a semi-
structured questionnaire. The analysis of fleet safety procedures focussed on work-related 
vehicle incident reporting, identification of hazard and risk exposures, effectiveness of 
training and induction programs, and analysis of current safety management systems 
including policy and procedures. Results of the study found that fleet safety within the 
organisation was not considered a priority and as a result, the full extent of organisational 
crashes and vehicle-related injuries was relatively unknown by senior management. In 
addition, this study identified a number of operational and procedural deficiencies in relation 
to fleet safety. This paper will further outline the major findings of the study and propose 
recommendations directed at improving fleet safety within organisations as well as integration 
of fleet safety within a WHSMS.  
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a growing awareness in Australia and many other countries of the need to devote 
more attention to the issue of fleet and work related road safety.  This is in part due to the 
growing body of evidence confirming the overall impact that fleet related safety issues have 
on business effectiveness and road safety (Downs et al, 1999; Haworth et al, 2000). In 
addition, over recent years, many jurisdictions have moved to clarify a vehicle used for the 
purpose of work as a “workplace” under WHS legislation (Hoskins, 2003). Therefore, 
organisations are required to include work-related driving within their organisational WHS 
regulation compliance. Fleet and work related motor vehicle incidents represent a substantial 
emotional and financial cost to the community. In Australia, road crashes are the most 
common cause of work-related fatalities, injuries and absence from work (Haworth et al., 
2000), with the average time lost being greater than any other workplace claim (Stewart-
Bogle, 1999; WA, 2003). It has been estimated that the total cost of work related road 
incidents in Australia is in the vicinity of $1.5 billion (Wheatley, 1997) and the average total 
insurance cost of a fleet incident to organisations and society is approximately $28 000 
(Davey & Banks, 2005).  Estimates of the true cost for work related crashes suggest that 
hidden costs may be somewhere between 8-36 times vehicle repair/replacement costs (Murray 
et al, 2002).  These hidden costs include items such as, workers compensation, medical costs 
associated with injury to staff, injury rehabilitation, injury to third party, third party property 
loss, loss of productivity due to days off work, loss of position and staff backfill costs as a 
result of absence from work, legal costs associated with workers compensation and third party 
claims, increased risk, insurance premiums and potential loss of customers. 
A high proportion of work-related deaths and injuries as well as road trauma arise 
from work-related crashes.  Work-related traffic injuries are about twice as likely to result in 
death or permanent disability than other workplace accidents (Wheatley, 1997) and account 
for up to 23% of work related fatalities in Australia and 13% of the national road toll (Murray 
et al, 2002).  A further 26% of fatalities result from crashes which occur while commuting to 
and from work. This means that 49% of all work-related fatalities occur as a result of on-road 
crashes when commuting is taken into account (National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission, 1998). Therefore, there is an obvious and growing need for industry, 
government and the community to allocate resources to address the problem of work-related 
road crashes.   
How an organisation performs, or is required to perform, its operations may influence 
work-related driver safety. Previous research has confirmed the influence of a number of 
organisational factors on employee safety, including high mileage travel (Collingwood, 1997; 
Griffith, 1997), time pressures (Downs et al., 1999) and in particular organisational culture 
(Haworth et al., 2000). Other influences may include poor maintenance procedures, poor 
selection of vehicles for the job, selection and recruitment of drivers and lack of road safety 
policies and procedures, etc. These factors may have a direct influence on the incidence of 
work-related road incident, for example, worn tyres that are overlooked due to a poor 
maintenance program may cause a crash. In addition, organisational factors may influence 
driver behaviour, for example, time pressure to complete jobs may influence the driver to 
speed which in turn may contribute to the incident. Furthermore, research conducted by 
Murray et al. (2002) suggests that a number of organisations believe that safety, including 
work-related driver safety, is not considered an operational priority and that senior managers 
are often unaware of the problem and make safety a low priority behind ‘getting the job 
done’.  
 
Workplace Health and Safety Management Systems  
The available evidence suggests that the effectiveness of Workplace Health and Safety 
Management Systems (WHSMS) is highly dependent on how they are implemented. These 
systems are designed to be a linchpin in the existing systems of improving Workplace Health 
and Safety (WHS). In addition, a more systematic and integrated management of Workplace 
Health and Safety (WHS) is to make the regulation, advice, and local co-operation work more 
effectively and efficiently to improve the work environment (Gallagher, 1997). WHSMS 
therefore touches most of the major issues in the organisation and regulation of WHS.  
The success of a Workplace Health and Safety Management System depends on 
commitment from all levels and functions within an organisation, especially from senior 
management (AS/NZS 4801:2001). An effective Occupational Health and Safety 
Management System should contain the following requirements/levels: 
• Occupational Health and Safety Policy 
• Planning; 
• Implementation; 
• Measurement and Evaluation; and 
• Management Review (Bottomley, 1999). 
The completion and formal adoption of a policy is the foundation and should be 
integrated into the existing safety system by modifying and augmenting existing policies, 
procedures, people and performance issues to incorporate occupational road/vehicle-related 
risk (RoSPA, 2003). Assessment of the risk focuses on classifying the various driving tasks 
within the organisation, looking at risk factors associated with journeys, vehicles and drivers 
to ascertain whether existing safety measures are adequate or whether more needs to be done, 
enabling problems to be prioritised for attention. Having identified and prioritised the risk 
factors, a list of objective action plans can be developed to reduce risk at its source, 
addressing factors such as: vehicle selection and maintenance issues, work travel procedures, 
and driver selection and competence, etc. 
Monitoring and measuring performance brings together the various pieces of data to 
compare and contrast pre and post intervention performance (Gallagher, 1997; RoSPA, 2003). 
The essence is to assess how performance compares with previous periods, and against 
previously set targets. This information management phase provides measures to enable 
managers to manage more proactive interventions and to consider a range of supporting 
options to optimise effectiveness. Relevant data should be collected using methods which 
include proactive monitoring (sampling journey type, length and time; checking licences; 
driver assessment and training records; and vehicle checklists) and reactive monitoring 
(incident reports and incident investigation reports). Having assessed the system’s 
effectiveness and made any revisions to procedures, it is vital to review the process, including 
performance indicators to assess progress towards targets (RoSPA, 2003). Management can 
prepare performance reports to spread good practice and recommend practical variations 
leading to continuous improvement in the culture, policies, practices and performance of the 
organisation. 
Major incidents can frequently be traced to failures in safety management systems 
(Hopkins, 2002). Even when enormous effort has gone into refining these systems, it seems 
they remain fallible. It is largely for this reason that the concept of safety culture is now 
receiving widespread attention. This is not to say that systems are irrelevant, but rather that 
they will function better in organisations that have developed a culture of safety.                                              
As organisational problems and deficiencies are major stumbling blocks for a 
successful WHSMS, the organisational development needed to overcome these obstacles will 
be given special attention within this paper, specifically in relation to work-related driving 
safety. This paper documents the research process underpinning a practical 6 month project 
which was designed to ascertain both current practices and future system requirements for the 
integration of fleet-related issues into the larger WHSMS. In particular, the paper will 
examine current systems and staff perceptions in relation to fleet safety and identify fleet 
safety issues directed at improving fleet safety within the organisation as well as integration 
of fleet safety within a WHSMS.   
 
 
METHOD 
 
A case study methodology was adopted for the project, to facilitate an indepth 
examination of the operation of WHSMS in the government setting. The organisation 
examined was a Queensland Government owned corporation overseen by the Department of 
Natural Resources and Mines. The research focussed on the effectiveness of current systems 
including in-depth work-related vehicle incident reporting and analysis, identification of 
hazard and risk exposures, effectiveness of training and induction programs, and the operation 
of current safety management systems including policy and procedures. 
The case study was carried out within the organisation across five regional areas 
within the state of Queensland, and involved 146 participants ranging from field staff to 
management. The study sample was taken from a total organisational population of 532 staff 
(representing a participation rate of 27%). However, the study sample represented 64% of 
operational field type staff (n = 227) where driving was a significant part of their work-related 
duties. Employees not considered for this study consisted primarily of administration and 
engineering/design staff who performed little or no work-related driving. Interviews with 
participants were conducted on a face-to-face basis either individually or within small groups, 
using a semi-structured questionnaire that included open-ended questions. Some interviews 
were conducted by telephone due to the remoteness of the work location of some participants 
(n = 12). Participants included 82% randomly selected from operational field staff and the 
remaining 18% included operational managers and supervisors. The names of the 
interviewees were not recorded, and the various organisational departments and regions where 
the interviews took place and the name of the organisation remain confidential.                                                 
 To improve internal validity, triangulation was used to check the consistency of 
findings generated by the different data-collection methods and also data sources within the 
same method. Triangulation is the use of two or more methods of data collection that 
contribute to the verification and validation of qualitative analysis (Burns, 2000). In addition, 
during the conducting of interviews the interviewer completed written notes, which were later 
checked with participants as to correctness of quotes and interpretations made.  
  
 
RESULTS 
 
Current Systems Analysis 
The following section overviews the findings of a comprehensive search of current and 
historical WHS and Human Resource documents, records, and data files. Particular attention 
is given to the work-related driving safety systems in place within the organisation. 
Policy and Procedures – The review indicated that organisational work-related driving 
safety policy and procedures were inadequate. The documents lacked specific information 
regarding work-related driving safety and issues of accountability and responsibility including 
driver history and driver safety reference checks at time of initial employment. Rather, 
information within these documents only covered the steps to be completed in case of an 
incident/crash and general items of road safety, for example, wearing a seat belt, vehicle 
maintenance, etc. In addition, no details regarding work-related driving/travel were included 
in risk assessments. 
General WH&S inductions had only been undertaken within the last twelve months, 
coinciding with the roll out of the organisation’s Workplace Health and Safety System. 
Within the general induction program there was insufficient information regarding work-
related driving/fleet issues. The general Employee Induction, located on the organisation’s 
Intranet site, only referenced the procedure for incident reporting and how to book a pool 
vehicle. This suggests that fleet/vehicle safety was either not considered a priority or that 
management were not aware of the problem. In addition, no regional site rules (used for 
induction purposes) referred to fleet/vehicle safety.  
Existing policies indicated that fitted and optional safety features on vehicles, 
including 4WD’s were not considered prior to purchase. Rather, it appeared that vehicle 
purchasing was generally based on the lowest cost. Furthermore, there appeared to be no 
consultation with operational staff regarding the suitability of vehicle types and/or safety 
features. The organisation did not obtain advice regarding the purchase of vehicles from 
safety professionals nor operational staff regarding type of vehicle required for a particular 
task/job or available or optional safety features, etc. 
The organisation did have procedures in place to deal with crash/incident reporting 
and these were documented in in-vehicle kits. However, during vehicle inspections it was 
observed that not all vehicles had these kits and some were incomplete. 
Incident/Crash Records - Data contained in Table 1 was obtained by individually 
examining each WHS incident report form over an eleven month period (n = 142), which 
coincided with the initial role out of the organisation’s WHSMS.  
No analysis of vehicle incident data was conducted by the organisation in order to 
identify the relevant factors contributing to incidents. In addition, only limited details specific 
to the incident/crash were provided on the form, while some details were incomplete. From 
analysis of Table 1 it was noted that over 40% (total Fleet incidents n = 57 divided by total 
WHS incidents n = 142) of all reported incidents were vehicle (fleet) related. In addition, in 
two separate months fleet incidents equalled WHS incidents and on one occasion (October) 
exceeded WHS incidents. The relatively large number of vehicle (fleet) related incidents 
suggests that work-related driving within the organisation is an important safety issue. 
OPERATION CENTRE INCIDENTS 
 
Brisbane Mareeba Ayr Biloela Bundaberg Ipswich Contract Totals 
 
Month 
 
Fleet Other Fleet Other Fleet Other Fleet Other Fleet Other Fleet Other Fleet Other Fleet Other 
Feb  0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Mar  0 0 0 2 0 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 8 
Apr 0 0 1 1 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 6 7 
May  0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
June  0 0 0 0 1 4 2 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 5 8 
July  0 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 5 
Aug  1 2 1 3 3 5 0 3 2 3 1 0 0 0 8 16 
Sept  0 1 0 1 2 6 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 6 10 
Oct  0 0 1 0 2 2 5 3 4 5 0 0 0 0 12 10 
Nov  1 1 1 0 2 3 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 7 7 
Dec  0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 
Total 2 5 4 8 19 33 14 13 13 17 5 7 0 2 57 85 
Table 1: Comparison of Organisation Reported Fleet and WHS Incidents 
Note: Fleet = Fleet-related incidents and Other = other workplace incidents 
Traffic violations/infringements were not recorded under the organisation’s current 
reporting system. Therefore, the extent to which disobeying road rules (such as, speeding, 
running red lights, etc) may contribute to road crashes remains unknown. Similarly, the 
opportunity to identify potentially risky drivers and behaviours by monitoring infringement 
data was untapped. In addition, no periodic licence checks were performed to ascertain the 
current licence status of drivers. Licences were only checked at the time of initial 
employment.  
Current Work-Related Driving Countermeasures - Current organisational work-
related driving countermeasures were inadequate and reactive in nature. If an employee was 
involved in multiple vehicle crashes then he/she would be required to undertake a “Defensive 
Driving” training program. These programs were basically generalised “off-the-shelf” driver 
training programs and not targeted specifically to the requirements of the individual or the 
organisation. No training needs analysis was undertaken prior to these programs nor were any 
evaluations conducted regarding any safety improvement due to the training.  
 
Employee Interview Analysis 
 The findings from the interviews are outlined below under four main areas: (1) factors 
impacting on ability to drive safely for work; (2) knowledge and/or training received in 
relation to work-related driving safety; (3) any factors contributing to driving incidents or 
near misses; and (4) potential countermeasures for the improvement of work-related driving 
safety.  
1) Factors impacting on ability to drive safely for work  
Responses to questions regarding factors that impact on driver ability to drive safely 
for work were comprehensive, with some common recurring issues emerging. The results are 
presented below according to four specific themes that emerged, as outlined in Table 2. 
Within the Organisational theme interview participants perceived fatigue and work 
pressures as the two primary factors that impact on their ability to drive safely for work. For 
example, “we are regularly expected to drive to a job, could be anywhere, work all day then 
drive home….could mean a twelve hour day….we get paid overtime but after a while your 
stuffed” (reference to fatigue) (male driver).  
  The Individual theme indicated a diverse range of issues specifically relating to 
individual behaviour. Younger drivers, particularly apprentices, reported inexperience in 
relation to the use of 4WD’s and larger vehicles and also pressures placed upon them by older 
drivers/tradesman to take risks while driving (see example in Table 2). The younger drivers 
believed they had to comply with this pressure otherwise they would be victimised. Some 
drivers (n=6) reported personal problems, for example, relationships and marriage separation 
as factors impacting on their ability to drive safely. For example, “I’ve been going through a 
bullshit divorce…have not slept much…I just can’t seem to concentrate at times” (male 
driver). Interviews also revealed issues of sensation seeking among drivers, for example, as 
one driver stated “I love to drive fast, I know it is illegal but I find myself falling asleep if I 
drive slow…I don’t think it’s a problem I haven’t had an accident in 15 years of driving” 
(male driver).  
Themes Content Examples of Participant Response  
Organisational Work pressure; time of day travel; 
length of work day (fatigue); 
distractions 
I feel pressured to get to call outs….like I 
should be there yesterday (male driver) 
Individual Inexperience; personal problems; 
sensation seeking; peer pressure; 
fatigue 
All the time I’m told to run yellow lights or go 
quicker by tradies…but they won’t drive and 
take the risks (young male apprentice) 
Road 
Conditions 
Adverse weather; dirt roads; 
environmental conditions; familiarity 
I didn’t see the roo, the sun was in my eyes 
(male driver) 
Vehicle Visibility; suitability I drive a sedan on mainly dirt roads….some 
roads are shocking…. I need a 4WD but they 
won’t give me one (male driver) 
Table 2: Themes associated with factors impacting on ability to drive safely for work 
The Road Conditions theme primarily related road and weather conditions that drivers 
believed impacted on their driving. However, it was noted that driving behaviours, for 
example, driving at incorrect speeds to suit road conditions were also prominent in the 
examples. Road familiarity was one factor that was raised by a number of participants. For 
example, some drivers reported being required to travel outside their own usual work areas 
due to workload and absentee issues. With reference to an incident where a driver was 
working outside his own familiar work area, he stated that “it wasn’t my patch (reference to 
individual work area), wasn’t used to the road, went around the turn too fast and hit soft 
gravel… the bloody ute spun out” (driving on dirt rural road) (male driver).  
The Vehicle theme highlighted factors of poor rear visibility and suitability of some 
vehicles, for example, “guys stack equipment in the centre of the tray between the storage 
cupboards which reduces rear visibility” (male driver). Furthermore, a number of drivers 
(n=26) were dissatisfied with the vehicle they drove for work (see example in Table 2).  
2) Knowledge and/or training received in relation to work-related driving safety  
Interviews with participants revealed three types of training that had been conducted 
within the organisation. Firstly, as stated previously, Defensive Driving programs were used 
by the organisation as a countermeasure for repeat crash offenders. However, investigation 
showed that only the Biloela region had complied and actually required four drivers (repeat 
crash offenders) to attend a program. No evaluation of the training was implemented, 
however, participant consensus regarding the training program was similar. For example, one 
driver stated “I thought it was bloody great, especially driving in wet weather (reference to 
skid pan driving) a great couple of days, considering I was there because I had a couple of 
small prangs” (male driver). In addition, two of the four drivers had been involved in fleet 
incidents after the Defensive Driving program. Secondly, the Biloela region did recognise that 
four-wheel drive (4WD) vehicles were involved in significant numbers of crashes and sent 
operational drivers (n=14) who drove a 4WD to specific training. Comments regarding the 
training were again similar with one male driver stating that the “four-wheel drive training 
was OK, but most of the training was how to get out of a bog, not how to handle the vehicle” 
(male driver). No training needs analysis or evaluation of the training was undertaken. 
Finally, online fleet safety training CD’s were sent to all regions by Head Office for all staff 
to complete. However, no evaluation was conducted to check if this training was actually 
undertaken by staff. Indeed, from the interviews it was noted that the majority (91%) stated 
they had not completed it. One driver stated with reference to content of the CD that “it was 
so f***in boring, I didn’t finish it…just told my supervisor I did” (male driver). 
With reference to fleet-related knowledge/information and inductions received by 
employees, interview participants unanimously stated that they had not received any 
information or fleet specific inductions. For example, one driver stated “induction, the only 
induction you get regarding work vehicles is where to park in the bloody depot” (male 
driver). 
3) Factors contributing to driving incidents or near misses  
Participants were reluctant to talk about specific driving incidents, an example of the 
“do not admit liability” culture evident within many organisations. Only 15 (10%) 
participants admitted to having a work-related driving incident, whereas 48 (33%) participants 
stated they were involved in a work-related driving near miss. The main factors identified 
included fatigue, inattention, road familiarity and work pressures. Fatigue was a common 
issue raised by participants as an important factor in incidents/near misses. Interview 
participants reported that the considerable kilometres/time required to travel to job locations, 
combined with the effects of working all day and then needing to return to the depot that same 
day resulted in fatigue. For example, one driver stated, “working out at (location) all day and 
was tired driving back…don’t know what happened, wasn’t concentrating and didn’t see the 
tyre on the road (truck tyre blow out left on road) swerved to miss it, lost control and rear of 
the wagon side-swiped a tree” (male driver). In addition, inattention due to fatigue was 
identified as a potential factor in a number of incidents/near misses. One driver stated that on 
returning late he “wasn’t thinking of driving and didn’t see the f***in roo till too late” (male 
driver).  
Performing paperwork and eating meals whilst driving was common, for example, one 
driver stated that he “was rushing to get to a call out, I didn’t have lunch…just stopped to get 
a pie from the bakery… driving along some pie dripped on my leg, while trying to wipe it off I 
ran into the back of the vehicle in front who had slowed down to turn the corner…I only took 
my eyes off the road for a second” (male driver).   
4) Potential countermeasures for the improvement of work-related driving safety  
The aim of this question was to ascertain from organisational staff what they 
perceived could be done to improve work-related driving. General consensus from operational 
field staff was that any countermeasures or interventions would need to be cost-effective or 
they would not be implemented by management, for example, “unless it doesn’t cost much 
they (management) won’t do it” (male driver). Other participants (n=5) took a more hostile 
stance in regards to management-driven countermeasures. One typical participant response 
was: “get management to drive two to three hours to a job…do a full f***ing days manual 
labour, then drive home again…see if they can do it day in day out over f***ing time” (male 
driver). Generally operational drivers viewed work-related driving as a WHS issue and 
welcomed any countermeasure to improve safety, as long as it did not mean extra work for 
them, for example, one participant’s response suggested “anything as long as it doesn’t mean 
more paperwork” (male supervisor). In contrast, interviews with management, particularly 
executive management (based at the Brisbane Head Office) revealed a reluctance to consider 
work-related driving as a serious organisational WHS issue, for example, one participant 
stated “it’s a driver issue, not an organisational issue” (female manager). In addition, further 
discussion with a senior operational manager whose performance bonus was dependant partly 
on the numbers of WHS incidents stated: “do vehicle incidents have to be recorded as 
workplace incidents…after all they are only road accidents…what can we do”  (male 
manager).  
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
The exploratory analysis of organisational records, documents and data files combined 
with information received from the employee interviews revealed significant deficiencies 
within the organisation’s WHS management system, specifically in relation to work-related 
driving safety. The following discussion identifies deficient fleet safety policies and 
procedures and suggests recommendations directed at improving fleet safety within the 
organisation as well as integration of fleet safety within a WHSMS.   
Without the commitment and support from both management and employees a safety 
system is unlikely to be effective. To establish a positive safety culture requires senior 
management commitment and involvement of employees, at all levels, in decision-making 
(Gallagher, 1997). The study suggested that management did not consider fleet safety a WHS 
issue or an organisational issue. Rather, some management suggested that vehicle incidents 
were an individual driver issue. Wishart and Davey (2004) suggested that organisations 
commonly adopt a blameworthy methodology when reporting, investigating and 
implementing interventions within the work environment. The study revealed that this 
approach, generally directed toward the driver of an incident, promoted a ‘do not admit 
liability’ culture within the organisation and appeared to contribute to some employees failure 
to report incidents. Furthermore, employees cannot operate under the organisation’s policy 
and procedures if there are none. To encourage employee commitment organisational fleet 
safety policies and procedures are required to be developed, specifying accountability and 
responsibility, to ensure all staff are aware of what is required. 
Seljack (2002) suggested that organisation’s should take a risk management approach 
to fleet safety and integrate fleet safety management into the WHSMS. This approach assists 
employers to meet their obligations under both occupational health and safety law and road 
transport law. When developing risk assessments for the organisation, a range of hazards 
should be considered in relation to the driver, the vehicle and the journey, specifically 
including travel time in work orders (Seljak, 2002). Drivers who participated in the study 
perceived that work pressures and fatigue were primary factors that impacted on their ability 
to drive safely and contributed also to some incidents/crashes. In relation to work pressures, 
drivers felt that they had to utilise travel time to ‘make up time’ to meet organisational and 
customer demands. Examples included speeding and eating or doing paperwork while 
driving. Interview participants also stated that fatigue was a significant fleet safety factor. 
Long work hours and daily travel to and from job sites increased the risk of fatigue. In 
addition, drivers stated that inattention-related incidents/near misses were directly related to 
fatigue. For example, drivers often felt tired and as a result suffered difficulties concentrating 
on the driving task and road environment. Fatigue research conducted by Hartley et al. (2000) 
confirms the risks in this area, finding that inattention can exacerbate the incidence of fatigue-
related crashes.  
Interview participants indicated that “time of day” may also be a significant fleet 
safety factor, for example, early morning and late afternoon are typical times where animals 
are crossing or located near roadsides. Further evidence of this is that 26% of all recorded 
work-related vehicle incidents occurred due to “hitting animals”, primarily kangaroos and 
occurring late afternoon. A risk assessment could be conducted to ascertain if rural work 
schedules can be changed to allow travel, particularly return travel, to be undertaken prior to 
those hours of most risk from the contributing factor of animals on or near the roadside.  
Individual driver behaviour was influenced by a number of factors. Some interview 
participants indicated relationships and marriage separation as factors impacting on their 
ability to drive safely. Previous research has suggested that emotional stress may influence 
aggressive behaviour, possibly by increasing risk taking (Hampson, 1984). In addition, 
McMurray (1970) reported that during the six months before and after divorce, drivers in her 
study had a significantly higher crash and violation rate than the general population. The 
types of violations more often found at these times included speeding, failure to yield, and 
close following. Work relationships were potentially another form of influence regarding safe 
driving. For example, inexperienced drivers, particularly apprentices, were encouraged by 
other staff to take risks while driving, potentially placing they and members of the public 
under risk of a vehicle crash. Peer pressure influence to undertake any type of work-related 
risk is a breach of WHS legislation (WHS Qld, 1995) and information affirming the illegality 
of this act should be included within the organisation’s policies and subsequently 
communicated to all staff. 
Interview participants reported a lack of familiarity with road condition as a factor 
contributing to vehicle incidents. Drivers are frequently required to perform work outside 
their usual designated work areas because of increased work demands or illness to other staff, 
etc. Crashes have occurred, primarily on rural gravel roads, due to sudden changes in road 
condition. This may be a case of not driving to suit the road conditions, for example, speeding 
and aggressive driving on gravel roads. However, measures should be considered regarding 
induction and familiarisation of drivers with other work areas, outside peak work periods. 
Interview participants identified poor visibility from vehicles (due to vehicle load and 
equipment) and suitability of vehicles as significant influences on fleet safety. Inspection into 
the design of vehicle rear storage space could be undertaken to ascertain if rear vision can be 
improved. In addition, organisational procedures could be developed to outline requirements 
of safe loading of vehicles. From the current systems analysis it was revealed that the 
organisation purchased most vehicles based on the cheapest quote. It was noted also by 
interview participants that some vehicles purchased were not suitable for the work to be 
performed or road terrain travelled. Research conducted by Anderson & Plowman (1999) 
suggested that a best practice organisation selects vehicles not only on cost alone, however, 
takes into account potential beneficial safety features. Therefore, the organisation should 
consider additional safety features and vehicle suitability when selecting/purchasing new 
vehicles, especially where off road travel is undertaken.  
Responses to questions relating to driver training and induction were relatively brief. 
This was expected considering the lack of training and competence documents kept by the 
organisation. However, it was due to the lack of documenting evidence that questions relating 
to training/induction were conducted to ascertain if training had been completed and not 
recorded. Evidence from the study suggested that fleet safety training was primarily reactive 
in nature, a reaction to individual multiple incidents. In addition, interview participants stated 
that other training (i.e. 4WD training) did not meet the specific requirements of drivers in the 
organisation. Before any Fleet Safety Training is conducted a thorough training needs 
analysis should be conducted to ascertain if the training meets the requirements of the 
individual and organisation. Evaluations should also be conducted after training/education to 
ascertain if the training was effective. Furthermore, general safety inductions should include a 
work-related driving safety component for all new employees. To meet WHS legislative 
requirements, fleet/vehicle-related safety should also be included within site rules and 
regional site specific inductions. In addition, an induction into use and safety features should 
be performed for drivers of all new vehicles issue. 
An important component of the WHSMS is the continual review and evaluation. This 
is ongoing and fleet related issues should be included within all reviews and including safety 
inspections and audits. Regular review and evaluation of the WHSMS identifies whether 
systems are effective and efficient and highlights those areas which require further attention, 
for example, additional countermeasures/interventions. The WHSMS is basically a cycle of 
continual safety improvement.  
 
 
 
Study Limitations 
The study sample does pose issues relating to the generalisability of the results. 
However, sufficient detail was obtained to meet the aim of the study, that is, to identify fleet 
safety issues directed at improving fleet safety within the organisation as well as integration 
of fleet safety within a WHSMS. In addition, similar deficiencies and factors that impacted 
fleet safety within this study are also highlighted within other fleet-related research literature 
(Anderson & Plowman, 1999; Collingwood, 1997; Murray et al., 2002; WA, 2003; Wishart & 
Davey, 2004). However, other studies should be undertaken within both government and 
industry organisations to confirm the findings emerging from this study.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study used two methods to explore and identify issues and deficiencies for the 
improvement of work-related driving within the organisation, particularly in relation to the 
integration of fleet safety within the WHSMS.  
Success of the integration of fleet/work-related driving safety within the organisation’s 
WHSMS requires full management and employee support and commitment (Gallagher, 
1997). This should be encouraged at an early stage of fleet safety integration. The 
organisation should adopt a proactive approach to fleet safety and not the current reactive 
approach, for example, based on developing controls after incidents have occurred. A risk 
management methodology should be undertaken to improve fleet safety within the 
organiation and determine priorities for WHSMS integration.   
A ‘no blame’ approach should also be adopted and encouraged across the 
organisation. Historically, organisations have adopted a reactive approach to work-related 
road/vehicle incidents and usually focus on a single countermeasure, for example, skills based 
driver training, in an attempt to improve the organisation’s fleet safety (Wishart & Davey, 
2004). This study suggests that a singular countermeasure will not improve work-related road 
safety and organisations need to adopt a proactive multiple strategy approach and target long-
term intervention strategies aimed at not only a fleet safety system but also behavioural and 
cultural aspects of the organisation. Continual review and evaluation of systems combined 
with identified interventions is required to ensure continual improvement of fleet/work-related 
driving safety within the organisation. 
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